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We use monthly time-series data for 20 large U.S. cities to test the deterrence hypothesis (arrests 
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Crime and Arrests:  Deterrence or Resource Reallocation? 
 
1. Introduction 
Many studies find that increasing deterrence reduces crime (Levitt, 1997, 1998; Cornwall 
and Trumbull, 1994; Lee and McCrary, 2005; Klick and Tabarrok, 2005; Evans and Owens, 
2007).  Decker and Kohfeld (1985) suggest, however, that while deterrence may reduce crime 
rates, it is more likely that arrests follow from an increase in crime as police reallocate 
enforcement resources to combat the increase in crime (Benson et al., 1994).  A majority of these 
studies have used county- or state-level data in cross-sectional or panel regressions, and they 
implicitly assume heterogeneity in the crime and arrest relationship across regions.    
   In this note we use monthly time-series data for 20 large U.S. cities to explore the short-
run relationship between crime rates and arrests – specifically, we test both the deterrence 
hypothesis (arrests reduce crimes) and the resource reallocation hypothesis (arrests follow from 
an increase in crime).  The city-level analyses conducted here afford several advantages over 
previous studies.  First, the high-frequency time-series data used in our models allow us to avoid 
(or, at least, better minimize) the complex simultaneity problem between crime and deterrence 
that has plagued studies using cross-sectional or panel data.  Second, Topel (1994) and Glaeser 
and Sacerdote (1999) have shown that crime rates vary significantly across regions, so the 
individual analysis of 20 cities done here provides new insight not afforded by previous studies 
that have used more aggregated data and implicitly assume homogeneity across regions.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
  Our city-level crime data are from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR).  We obtained the monthly number of offenses and arrests for seven categories of   3 
crime: murder, rape, assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.
1  Data were 
obtained for the 20 largest U.S. cities based on 1990 population for which sufficient data were 
available.  The sample period for the majority of cities covers the period December 1983 to 
December 2004 (Table 1).
2
 
   
2.1 Methodology 
  To test the deterrence hypothesis and the resource reallocation hypothesis, respectively, 
we estimate (by OLS) equations (1) and (2) for each of the seven crime categories in each of the 






where Ct denotes criminal offenses and ARr denotes arrests for the respective crime.   To capture 
short-run changes, all variables are transformed into percent changes and are included with lag 
length r based on the Akaike information criterion.
3
                                                 
1 The agency-level UCR data were retrieved from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data via the Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan at 
  Monthly dummy variables are included to 
account for any seasonality; the unemployment rate and real minimum wage are included in (1) 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/ucr.html (last accessed March 6, 2010).  Although the UCR is the most widely 
used source of crime data, the fact that these data are self-reported by cities raises some possible problems.  These 
include underreporting by police departments and differences in the collection and reporting of criminal activity 
across cities.     
2 The failure of cities to report crime data for several months or several years early or late in the sample period has 
shortened the sample for several cities.  For some cities, the absence of offense and arrest statistics for certain crimes 
over an extended period mid-sample led us to omit the crime from the list of seven crime equations estimated.  In 
addition, appropriate steps were taken to handle the occasional monthly missing observation to preserve the sample 
for estimation purposes (Maltz, 1999, p. 28).   
3 Our empirical model closely follows that of Corman and Mocan (2000, 2005). 
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to control for business cycle conditions that may influence crime rates (Gould et al, 2002; 
Corman and Mocan, 2000, 2005); and city- and year-specific dummy variables are included in 
the panel regressions.
4
  The total effect of arrests in equation (1) and crime in equation (2) is determined by 
summing the lagged coefficients for each variable and then calculating an elasticity using the 
means of the respective variables.
  
5
   
  The elasticities are interpreted as the effect of a percentage 
change in the growth rate of the independent variable on the percentage change in the growth 
rate of the dependent variable.   The elasticities from equation (1) should be negative to support 
the deterrence hypothesis, and the elasticities from equation (2) should be positive to support the 
resource reallocation hypothesis. 
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 Deterrence   
  Weak support for the deterrence hypothesis is found (Table 2), as most of the elasticities 
are not statistically significant.  This supports the notion that criminals are myopic and also do 
not have perfect information regarding changes in deterrence (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985; Lee 
and McCrary, 2005).   The elasticity estimates are quite different across cities, however, thus 
suggesting heterogeneity in the crime and arrest relationship across cities.  For the crimes of 
burglary and larceny, five and seven of the elasticities, respectively, are negative and significant, 
thus suggesting that, for those cities, increasing burglary and larceny arrests reduces the number 
                                                 
4 We used Newey-West standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Also, each empirical 
model includes an error-correction term to account for a long-run equilibrium relationship. 
5 Let Ω be a sum of coefficients.  The elasticity (η) is computed as η = Ω · (X/Y) , where Y is the dependent 
variable and X is the independent variable.  The variance of the elasticity is calculated as Var(η) = 
2 (X/Y) · 
Var(Ω), where Var(Ω) is calculated using the standard formula for the variance of a sum – summing the variances of 
each individual coefficient and the covariance between each coefficient pair.     5 
of these offenses.   The responsiveness of crime to arrests appears to be less than one-to-one 
since most of the elasticities are less than one in absolute value.   
 
3.2 Resource Reallocation 
    We find much stronger support for the resource reallocation hypothesis, as the effect of 
crime on arrests is positive and statistically significant for a large number of cities and crimes 
(Table 3).  In addition, the elasticities are quite different across cities.  Of the seven crime 
categories, an increase in less-violent crimes leads to greater arrests for these crimes, especially 
robbery (largest coefficients) and motor vehicle theft.  A positive and significant robbery 
elasticity was found for 15 of the 20 cities and a positive and significant vehicle theft elasticity 
was found for 12 of the 20 cities.  Six of the seven elasticities from the pooled sample of cities 
are positive and statistically significant.     
 
4. Summary  
  Crime and arrest data were used to test the deterrence hypothesis and the resource 
reallocation hypothesis for 20 individual U.S. cities.  We found weak support for the deterrence 
hypothesis and much stronger support for the resource reallocation hypothesis.  The latter may 
reflect the possibility that law enforcement makes a greater effort to reduce an increase in crimes 
that are more visible to residents, as well as to businesses and tourists.  Our results also reveal 
heterogeneity in the crime and arrest relationship across cities. 
 ____________________ 
The views expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis or the Federal Reserve System.   6 
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Table 1: Cities and Sample Periods
a 
 
City  Sample Period  Sample Size  City  Sample Period  Sample Size 
Baltimore  1983:12 to 1998:12  181  Memphis  1985:1 to 2004:12  240 
Boston  1989:5 to 2004:12  188  Milwaukee  1983:12 to 2004:12  253 
Cleveland  1983:12 to 1998:9  178  New Orleans  1983:12 to 2004:12  253 
Columbus  1983:12 to 2002:12  229  Philadelphia  1983:12 to 2004:12  253 
Dallas  1983:12 to 2004:12  253  Phoenix  1983:12 to 2004:11  252 
Detroit  1983:12 to 2004:12  253  San Antonio  1983:12 to 2004:12  253 
El Paso  1983:12 to 2004:12  253  San Diego  1983:12 to 2004:12  253 
Houston  1983:12 to 2004:12  253  San Francisco  1983:12 to 2004:12  253 
Indianapolis  1996:1 to 2004:12  108  San Jose  1983:12 to 2001:8  213 
Los Angeles  1983:12 to 2004:12  253  Seattle  1983:12 to 1997:12  169 
a 
The August 1997 missing value for murders was replaced with the August 1996 value for Baltimore, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, 
Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Orleans, and Philadelphia.  For Columbus, the October 1991 and 1998 missing values for rape 
arrests were replaced with the October 1990 and October 1997 values, respectively; the October 1998 missing value for robbery 
arrests was replaced with the October 1997 value.  For Milwaukee, the March 1986 missing values for all arrests were replaced 
with March 1985 values; the July 2002 missing value for rape was replaced with the July 2001 value.  For Philadelphia, the 
November 1988 missing values for arrests for all crimes were replaced with the November 1987 values.  For Seattle, the May 
1986 and June 1992 missing values for arrests for all crimes were replaced with the May 1985 and June 1991 values, 






 Table 2:  Testing the Deterrence Hypothesis - Results
a 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percentage Change in the Number of Crimes 
 
  Murder  Rape  Assault  Robbery  Burglary  Larceny  Vehicle Theft 
City  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags  Arrest 
Elasticity  Lags 
Baltimore  0.199  1-2  0.543  1-2  -0.017  1  0.001  1  0.040  1  -0.070
**  1-2  -0.060  1 
Boston  --  --  0.002  1  0.000  1  -0.004  1  -0.039  1  -0.038  1-2  -0.035  1-4 
Cleveland  --  --  -1.577  1-7  -0.214  1  -0.446  1-6  -0.013  1  0.435  1  -0.018  1 
Columbus  --  --  -0.040  1  0.004  1-3  -0.170  1-3  0.395  1-10  -0.038  1-8  -0.006  1-3 
Dallas  -0.039  1-3  0.010  1  0.766
*  1-11  -0.113
**  1  -0.229
+  1  -0.497
**  1-2  -0.012  1 
Detroit  -0.267  1  --  --  0.994
*  1-5  0.017  1  0.007  1-3  0.799
*  1-6  -0.177
**  1-4 
El Paso  --  --  0.002  1  0.0921  1  -0.762
**  1-6  -0.005  1-3  -0.116
+  1-3  -0.018  1 
Houston  -0.449  1-4  0.643  1  -0.050  1  -0.041  1  -0.185
*  1-2  0.006  1-3  -0.340
**  1-3 
Indianapolis  --  --  -0.167  1  0.422  1-3  -0.171  1  0.203  1-8  0.557  1-11  -0.082  1-11 
Los Angeles  -0.006  1-2  0.003  1  0.074  1  -0.366  1-9  -0.029
+  1  -0.895  1-11  0.022  1 
Memphis  --  --  0.002  1-9  -0.368
+  1-9  -0.026  1  -0.008  1  -0.129
**  1  -0.039
+  1 
Milwaukee  0.002  1  -0.085  1  0.364  1-2  -0.020  1-2  0.005  1  -2.645**  1  0.078  1 
New Orleans  -5.502**  1-7  -0.018  1-2  -0.017  1  -0.041*  1-2  -0.034  1-3  -0.012  1  -0.131  1 
Philadelphia  0.006  1  -0.006  1  0.004  1  -0.379
*  1  -0.030  1  2.273  1-4  -0.038  1-9 
Phoenix  --  --  0.055  1-5  -0.138  1  0.004  1-2  -0.432
**  1-3  -0.079
**  1-2  0.043
*  1 
San Antonio  --  --  --  --  -0.005  1  0.048  1-2  0.006  1-6  0.015  1  -0.000  1 
San Diego  --  --  0.192  1  0.026  1  -0.011  1-7  -0.011  1  0.759  1-8  1.148  1-13 
San Francisco  --  --  --  --  -0.871
*  1-4  0.003  1  -0.039
+  1  -0.007  1  0.035  1 
San Jose  --  --  -0.061  1-2  -0.161
*  1-2  0.010  1-2  0.003  1-4  -0.245
*  1-4  -0.175  1 
Seattle  --  --  0.022  1-2  0.014  1  -0.063  1  -0.026  1  0.066  1  0.046  1 
Pooled Cities  -0.557  1-3  -0.037  1-2  -0.006  1-3  -0.070
*  1-3  -0.009  1-2  -0.175  1-4  -0.002  1-3 
a 
The elasticities are calculated from the sum of the arrest coefficients in equation (1).  + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.      9 
 
Table 3:  Testing the Resource Reallocation Hypothesis - Results
a 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percentage Change in the Number of Arrests 
 
  Murder  Rape  Assault  Robbery  Burglary  Larceny  Vehicle Theft 
City  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags  Crime 
Elasticity  Lags 
Baltimore  0.009  1-2  -0.117
*  1  0.028  1  6.262
*  1-2  -0.149  1-5  -0.388  1-5  0.043
+  1 
Boston  --  --  -2.338  1  0.328  1  0.940
+  1-5  0.187
+  1-2  0.127  1-2  0.127  1 
Cleveland  --  --  0.231  1-5  0.128  1  1.847
**  1-7  0.522
**  1-3  0.428  1  2.676
**  1-4 
Columbus  --  --  0.933
**  1  18.229
**  1-12  0.210  1  0.291  1  29.486
**  1-9  10.415
*  1 
Dallas  0.721
**  1-5  0.012  1  0.504
**  1  13.598
**  1-4  0.013  1  0.168
**  1-2  2.829
**  1-8 
Detroit  0.045  1  --  --  -2.057
**  1-8  -3.893
*  1-4  -0.452
+  1  -0.505
+  1-2  0.140  1 
El Paso  --  --  0.212  1-3  0.269
*  1-2  4.582
*  1-2  2.229  1-5  0.052  1  0.024  1 
Houston  25.098
**  1-7  5.443
**  1-7  0.132  1  1.108
**  1-7  0.905
**  1-9  0.099
+  1  1.915
**  1-4 
Indianapolis  --  --  0.134
*  1-2  -0.015  1  0.161  1  0.284  1-2  0.211  1  0.234  1 
Los Angeles  0.066  1  0.905  1-3  1.014
**  1-4  10.442
+  1-8  0.087  1-3  -0.255  1-3  0.705  1-3 
Memphis  --  --  0.016  1  0.968
**  1  0.139
**  1-2  -0.177  1-4  0.185  1  5.505
**  1-3 
Milwaukee  0.035
+  1  -0.131
+  1  0.174
+  1  0.049
+  1  0.071  1-2  0.001  1  -0.138
+  1 
New Orleans  0.265  1-3  0.030  1  0.179  1  0.142  1-2  0.202  1  -0.048  1  0.175
+  1 
Philadelphia  4.519
**  1-8  0.075  1-4  -3.212  1-4  0.126
**  1-2  0.184
+  1-2  0.032  1-3  8.185
**  1-4 
Phoenix  --  --  -0.004  1  0.154  1  2.965
**  1-9  0.084  1-2  66.717
**  1-4  2.035
+  1-13 
San Antonio  --  --  --  --  -3.804  1  0.617
*  1-4  0.079
*  1  0.520  1  0.035  1 
San Diego  --  --  3.632
**  1-8  0.874
**  1-4  13.511
*  1-3  -0.604  1-2  14.992
*  1-4  0.781
*  1-4 
San Francisco  --  --  --  --  0.021  1  0.109
*  1  0.596
**  1-3  0.001  1  0.132  1-2 
San Jose  --  --  0.033
*  1-5  1.058  1  0.165
+  1  -0.093  1  0.851  1-5  0.040
**  1-2 
Seattle  --  --  0.003  1  6.617  1-3  -0.008  1  -0.849
*  1-3   -0.126  1  0.094
**  1-4 
Pooled Cities  0.304
**  1-4  0.192
**  1-3  0.148  1-3  0.347
**  1-3  0.416
**  1-3  0.022
*  1-2  0.290
**  1-3 
a 
The elasticities are calculated from the sum of the crime coefficients in equation (2).  + denotes significance at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at 1 percent.    
 